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PARTIES TO THE DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDING 
Clayton B. Hatch Investment, Inc. 
Richard Despain 
Stephen Jules Jones 
U.S. Government by and through its Internal Revenue 
Service 
L. Douglas Thompson dba LTD Investments 
Cottonwood Creek Estates, A Utah limited partnership 
Zions National Title 
Overland Thrift & Loan 
American First Mortgage 
American Savings & Loan 
Washburn Motor Company, Inc. 
Greg Wood 
Fred & Clark & Associates 
Dwane J. Sykes aka Dwane J. Sikes 
Dean Frandsen 
Belma Dean Frandsen 
Stephen Jules Jones & Dean Frandsen, a general 
partnership 
Utah Title & Abstract, Inc. 
Johnny M. Iverson 
LTD Development 
Jessie Divecha 
A. T. Divecha 
Duchesne County 
Respondent objects to the list of third-party 
defendants set forth in Sykes1 brief as parties in the 
proceedings below. As more fully set forth in Respondent's 
Brief, Sykes was never granted leave of court to file a Third-
Party Complaint, or Second Amended Third Party Complaint. 
PARTIES TO THIS APPEAL 
Clayton B. Hatch Investment, Inc, 
Dwane J. Sykes, pro se 
Attorney Mark Robinson filed pleadings in this Court 
as recently as September 19, 1987 on behalf of three entities 
claiming as cross-appellants to concur in Sykes1 Motion to 
Dismiss the appeal. His appeal was dismissed by the Supreme 
Court as being untimely and only respondent Clayton B. Hatch 
and appellant, Dwane Sykes are parties to this appeal. 
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Default Judgment was entered against certain 
defendants below. Thereafter summary judgment was granted in 
favor of Hatch and against the remaining defendants. 
Defendants' post-judgment motions were denied, and this appeal 
was taken. 
Case No. 870382-CA 
Category 14(b) 
This appeal was originally filed in the Supreme 
Court. Jurisdiction was conferred upon the Supreme Court by 
§78-2-2(3)(i) U.C.A., §78-2a-3 U.C.A. and Article VIII Section 
3 of the Utah State Consitution. Pursuant to Rule 4A, Rules 
of the Utah Court of Appeals, and Rule 4A of the Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court transferred this 
case to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the issue of inequitable forfeiture now 
raised by Sykes, timely or properly raised in the trial court? 
2. Can Sykes raise the issue of improper notice of 
default to his predecessors-in-interest when he obtained his 
interests in the property after the default and with knowledge 
of the default? 
3. Was summary judgment properly granted in favor of 
Hatch and against Sykes? 
4. Was Sykes given a fair opportunity to present his 
case? 
5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
awarding Hatch legal fees for Sykes' bad faith and should 
legal fees be awarded on appeal? 
DISPOSITIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Summary Judgment - Rule 56(c), U.R.Civ.P.: Motions and 
Proceedings Thereon. 
The motion shall be served at least ten days before 
the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party 
prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing 
affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. 
Summary Judgment - Rule 56(e), U.R.Civ.P.: Form of 
Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required, 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or 
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidait shall be attached thereto 
or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits 
to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a 
motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this Rule, an adverse party may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, 
but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this Rule, must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If 
he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
Third Party Practice - Rule 14(a), U.R.Civ.P.: When Defendant 
May Bring in Third Party. 
At any time after commencement of the action a 
defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a 
summons and complaint to be served upon a person not 
a party to the action who is or may be liable to him 
for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against 
him. The third-party plaintiff need not obtain leave 
to make the service if he files the third-party 
complaint not later than ten days after he serves his 
original answer. Otherwise he must obtain leave on 
motion upon notice to all parties to the action. 
Rule 2.8, Uniform Rules of Practice in the District Court: 
(a) All motions, except in uncontested or ex-parte 
matters, shall be accompanied by a statement of 
points and authorities and any affidavits relied upon 
in support thereof. 
(d) Decision shall be rendered without oral argument 
unless oral argument is requested by the court, in 
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which event the clerk shall set a date and time for 
argument. 
(e) In all cases where the granting of a motion 
would dispose of the action on the merits, with 
prejudice, the party resisting the motion may request 
oral argument, and such request shall be granted 
unless the motion has been summarily denied. If no 
such request is made, oral argument shall be deemed 
to have been waived. 
Section 78-27-56, Utah Code 1986: 
In civil actions, where not otherwise provided by 
statute or agreement, the court may award reasonable 
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court 
determines that the action or defense to the action 
was without merit and not brought or asserted in good 
faith. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Hatch filed a quiet title action seeking to foreclose 
out all right, title and interest of defendants to 
approximately 189 acres of undeveloped land located in 
Duchesne County. Hatch alleged default in the annual payment 
and property taxes on a real estate contract he had entered 
into with Richard Despain and Stephen Jones for the sale of 
the property. Hatch admittedly conveyed out two 10 acre 
parcels. Sykes1 original Answer claimed only an interest in 
these parcels. However, because of numerous conveyances and 
deeds from the other defendants after suit was commenced, he 
now claims damages under an inequitable forfeiture theory. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
Hatch commenced this lawsuit on March 21, 1985. 
(R.14) Sykes and other defendants filed answers. 
Eight defendants who had either been personally 
served or served by publication did not answer and based upon 
testimony of Clayton B. Hatch on June 10, 1985, as officer of 
Hatch, their interests were quieted in Hatch. Findings of 
Fact and Conclusion of Law (R. 199-202) and Judgment were 
entered against them on July 30, 1985. (R.204-206) 
Thereafter, Summary Judgment was granted in favor of 
Hatch and against the remaining defendants, and an Amended 
Order was entered November 26, 1986. (R.1158-1163) On 
December 4, 1986, Sykes, pro se (R.1164-1166) and other 
defendants, represented by common counsel (R.1172-1173) filed 
motions to amend judgment. These motions were denied by 
Ruling, signed by Judge Davidson and entered January 30, 1987, 
at which time the court also awarded Hatch approximately 
$16,000.00 in legal fees against Sykes, based on his bad 
faith. (R.1453-1454) 
On February 27, 1987, Sykes filed the present appeal, 
pro se, with the Utah Supreme Court. (R. 1472-1473) Mark 
Robinson also filed a Notice of Appeal on behalf of fourteen 
other defendants, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court as 
being untimely. (R.1490-1492) 
This case was transferred from the Supreme Court to 
this Court on September 4, 1987. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In August 1979, Hatch entered into a Real Estate 
Contract, whereby he agreed to sell to Richard Despain and 
Stephen Jules Jones, approximately 189 acres of undeveloped 
land located in Duchesne County, Utah. (R.138-144) The total 
purchase price was $130,000.00. The buyers paid $20,000.00 
down and agreed to pay the balance, together with interest at 
9% per annum, by paying annual installments, commencing August 
15, 1980, of $15,362.00, payments being applied first to 
accrued interest. Buyers agreed to pay all taxes and water 
assessments after January 1, 1980. Upon the payment of 
$700.00 per acre, in addition to the annual payment, seller 
agreed to release 20 acre parcels. 
In August 1980 Despain quitclaimed all interest he 
had to Jones, which deed was recorded December 31, 1980. 
(R.354) 
On December 21, 1980, Hatch conveyed ten acres to 
Stephen Jones. (R.325-327, 347) 
In September 1981 a subdivision plat was recorded, 
subdividing the land into lots 1 through 36. (R.1281) 
On May 24, 1983, Hatch conveyed two 5 acre lots, lots 
33 and 34 to Stephen Jones. (R.325-327, 348) No other 
conveyances were made by Hatch prior to the lawsuit. 
(R.325-327) 
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Hatch alleges that taxes for the years 1982 and 1983 
were delinquent in December, 1983 in the sum of approximately 
$8,000.00 which Hatch paid, (R.325-327) and also, that the 
annual payment was $7000 in default on September 15, 1983. 
(R. 325-327) (the annual payment was due August 15 but the 
contract provided for a 30 day grace period.) Although the 
total payment received in 1983 was $15,362 Hatch had deeded 
out ten acres, and denies that he agreed to accept $7000 for 
both the ten acres and towards the annual payment. 
On September 23, 1983, a Notice of Default was sent 
by certified mail to Jones on the address stated on the 
contract at 212 South State, Orem, Utah, by Hatch's attorney, 
but returned undelivered. (R.346) In December 28, 1983, 
another notice of default was sent to Jones at 695 North 700 
East, Provo, Utah (R.339-345) and in January 1984 the sheriff 
attempted service of the notice but stated on his return "no 
forwarding address known, his business partner who lives at 
this address refuses to cooperate." (R.339-342, 345) 
Hatch notified the escrow at Zions in April, 1984, of 
the default and attempted notices. (R.339-342) His affidavit 
also stated that his attorney, John C. Beaslin, had spoken 
with Jones on one occasion who indicated he would contact his 
attorney and return the call, which he did not do. The escrow 
returned the quit claim to Hatch. 
The Notice of Default was recorded May 11, 1984, in 
Duchesne County (R.326-327, R.352 par. 34). 
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No other written notice of the default was given to 
any other defendant. 
The quit claim from Despain and Jones to Hatch dated 
August 15, 1979 was delivered by the escrow to Hatch and 
recorded February 19, 1985. (R.5) Thereafter, on March 21, 
1985, suit was commenced. (R.l-4) Based upon a foreclosure 
report prepared, counsel named as defendants those persons and 
entities who interest appeared of record. (R.349-353) 
PARTIES 
Sykes was personally served March 27, 1985. 
(R.15-17) On May 29, 1985, he appeared pro se and filed an 
Answer, Counterclaim and Cross-Claim. (R.97-101, Addendum A) 
He generally denied the allegations of the Complaint and 
raised seven defenses: Conveyance by Hatch of a ten acre 
parcel to his predecessors in interest; validity of the 
Cottonwood Creek II Subdivision; his liens and waiver, latches 
and estoppel. The Counterclaim and Cross-claim sought to 
quiet title to the above described ten acre parcel in him; to 
dismiss the Complaint and for costs, legal fees and such other 
amounts and relief as the court deemed equitable. In Reply to 
his Counterclaim, Hatch acknowledged he conveyed the ten acre 
parcel described in Sykes pleadings to Jones but alleged no 
information and belief as to who the correct owner was 
presently. (R.125-129) 
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Dean Frandsen and Belma Frandsen were personally 
served with Summons and Complaint on March 29, 1985 (R.24-26) 
and service was also made personally on Frandsen for Stephen 
Jules Jones and Dean Frandsen, a general partnership. 
(R.21-23) Dean Frandsen and Belma Frandsen filed an Answer 
through counsel on April 22, 1985. (R.64-66) Their Answer 
contained general denials; alleged no default had occurred; 
that the contract was wrongfully terminated; that Plaintiff 
wrongfully refused to accept payment; that the interest of 
Jones and Despain had been conveyed to them; and requested the 
Complaint be dismissed. (R.64-66) 
Greg Wood answered through counsel (R.70-73) as did 
Cottonwood Creek Estates (R.102-104) and A.P. Divecha and 
Jessie Divecha. (R.76-77a) Overland Thrift and Loan, American 
First Mortgage, American Savings and Loan, Utah Title and 
Abstract, Inc., and Johnny M. Iverson (hereinafter referred to 
as "Financial Institutions and Iverson") answered through 
common counsel, Mark Robinson. (R.92-96) 
Hatch published notice for other named defendants he 
could not locate including Jones and all other unknown persons 
claiming an interest in the property. (R.105) 
On June 10, 1985, Hatch's Motion for Quiet Title as 
to those defendants who had not answered was heard and based 
on testimony was granted by minute entry. (R.120) The same 
day Richard Despain filed a pro se "Amended Complaint" which 
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contained general denials and requested the Complaint be 
dismissed. (R.118-119) This document contained no mailing 
certificate to Hatch's counsel. 
On June 17, 1985, after his default had been entered, 
L. Douglas Thompson filed a hand-written pro se answer for 
himself, and LTD Development and LTD Investments. (R.145) 
There was no mailing certificate to Hatch's counsel. Thompson . 
and LTD entities had been personally served April 2, 1985. 
(R.52-57) 
Based on the June 10th minute entry, Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Judgment were signed by Judge 
Davidson July 8, 1985, and filed July 30, 1985. (R.199-202) 
Title was quieted in Hatch as to the claims of the 
defaulting defendants which included Jones, Thompson dba LTD 
Investments and LTD Development and reserved the rights of the 
answering defendants set forth above. 
No motion to set aside this judgment has ever been 
made by any party, although Sykes on August 28, 1985, objected 
to it to the extent it quiets title in Hatch in those ten acre 
properties conveyed out or sets the subdivision aside. In June 
1986 Sykes objected to lack of notice of the 1985 judgment but 
stated no reasons he may have been prejudiced thereby. 
(R.406-408) 
DISCOVERY 
Sykes1 two Notices of Taking Deposition, each with a 
mailing certification of June 21, 1985, set Thompson's 
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depositions for June 19, 1985 (R.154-155 Addendum B) and 
Thompson's depositions for July 1, 1985 in Orem. (R.152-153) 
Counsel for Hatch objected as not receiving five days notice 
and attached the mailing envelope from Sykes showing it was 
postmarked June 24 not June 21. (R.156-160) Also, the Notice 
received by counsel was unsigned by Sykes and had no signed 
mailing certificate. (R.158-159) 
On July 18, 1985, Sykes claims he delivered a Notice 
of Deposition to Robert M. McRae at the Salt Lake City office 
for the taking of Thompson's deposition in Orem on July 26, 
1985. (R.207-208) Also on July 18, 1985, he states he mailed 
an Amended Notice of Taking deposition to Hatch's counsel at 
the Vernal office, scheduling the deposition of Thompson and 
three non-parties in Orem for July 23 and July 25. 
(R.210-211) Hatch's counsel again filed an objection as to 
timliness, and attached a copy of the mailing envelope from 
Sykes showing a postmark date of July 19 (R. 215-216) for the 
depositions set for July 23 and 25. Counsel also objected to 
Thompson's July 26 deposition as it was actually received July 
25, stamped in McRae & DeLand's office in Vernal, and not 
personally delivered to Robert M. McRae at 72 East 400 South, 
Salt Lake City as claimed in Sykes' mailing certificate. 
(R.245-248) 
On July 28, 1985, Sykes mailed Notice of Taking 
Deposition of Thompson and six other non-parties set for 
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August 7 (R.194-196) and another Notice of Deposition set for 
August 7 of four other defendants. (R. 197-198) This was not 
objected to by counsel for Hatch. 
On July 27, 1985, Sykes mailed a Notice of Continued 
Taking Deposition of Thompson's deposition set for July 26 and 
continuing the same to July 30, August 7 and August 8 in Orem. 
(R.249-250) Counsel for Hatch again objected to the timliness 
of notice. (R.251-253) 
Apparently Thompson did appear for his deposition on 
June 19, 1985. (R.563) 
Approximately one year later and two months after 
Hatch's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed (R.323) Sykes 
sent Notice of Depositions on June 16, 1986 for the first time 
scheduling Hatch's deposition for June 26, 1986, in Orem along 
with two other defendants. (R.479-483) Hatch was listed as 
the last deponent and the Notice stated if not completed on 
June 26 the deposition would be continued July 2, 1986. Hatch 
objected on the grounds it would be unduly burdensome to 
require Hatch to travel more than 100 miles to attend his 
deposition on two separate days when he is a resident of 
Uintah County and the lawsuit was pending in Duchesne County. 
(R.488-489) 
After the hearing on Hatch's Motion for Summary 
Judgment had been continued and reset for hearing on August 
26, (R.623-624) Sykes filed an unsigned 47 page Request for 
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Admissions and Interrogatories and Request for Production of 
Documents on July 31, 1986. (R.573-619) On August 10, 1986, 
Hatch answered certain of these requests, identified which 
documents had already been supplied to Sykes, and objected to 
the balance on numerous grounds such as they were not properly 
framed and Hatch could not form an intelligent answer. 
(R.631-639) 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
On April 22, 1986, Hatch filed his Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Affidavits and 
numerous Exhibits. (R.323-384) The mailing certificate was 
dated April 15, 1986. Sykes answered that he did not receive 
them and requested until June 30, 1986 to respond. (R.387-392) 
On May 21, 1986, the documents were again mailed to 
Sykes by Hatch's counsel. (R.393-394) 
After Hatch filed his memorandum, which argued Sykes 
had not filed to foreclose on his mechanic's liens, Hatch 
first received notice by letter from opposing counsel that a 
Third-party Complaint had been filed by Sykes on July 29, 
1985. (R.392) The Third-party Complaint contained no mailing 
certificate to Hatch's counsel. (R.176-182) 
In response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment Sykes filed the following: 
1) June 10, 1986, Verified Objection to Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R.406-413) 
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2) Copy Third-Party Complaint (R.414-420) 
3) Copy Lis Pendens (R.423-428) 
A hearing was set for June 16, 1986, on Hatch's 
Motion to Strike Certain Pleadings. (R.399-400) Sykes 
appeared personally and the Minute Entry states Judge Bunnell 
presided and the hearing for Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was continued to July 14, 1986. (R.487) 
One June 16, 1986, Sykes filed the following: 
1) Motion for Leave to File First Amended 
Third-Party Complaint (R.433-436) 
2) Document captioned "Verified Supporting 
Memorandum to Motion for Leave to file First Amended 
Third-Party Complaint and First Supplemental 
Memorandum Opposing Summary Judgment" (R.437-442) 
with the attachments which were deeds and assignments 
through which he claimed his interests, (R.443-4440, 
445-446) and the Affidavit of H. A. McCoy, (R.447-452) 
On June 17, 1986, Hatch filed his Reply Memorandum 
(R.453-458) and on June 19 another Affidavit by Clayton B. 
Hatch (R.484-486). 
On June 18, 1986, Hatch gave Notice of Hearing on his 
Motion for Summary Judgment to be heard July 14, 1986 
(R.490-491). 
On July 8, 1986, Sykes filed the following: 
1. Motion for Sanction for Refusal to Make Discovery 
(No memorandum) (R.509-510) 
-14-
2. Notice of Hearing on Motion for Sanctions and 
Motion to File Third-Party Complaint and First 
Amended Third-Party Complaint, Requested Continuance 
on Plaintiffs1 Summary Judgment. (R.511-513) 
3. One page Second Supplemental Memorandum Opposing 
Summary Judgment purporting to incorporate his First 
Amended Third-Party Complaint* (R.514-515) 
4. Motion for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint. 
(R.516-517) 
5. First Amended Third-Party Complaint (R.158-458) 
with attachments that had been already filed 
(R.549-554) 
On July 14 Hatch objected to the Filing of First 
Amended Third-Party Complaint on the grounds it added 
unnecessary parties and other causes of action relating to 
Cottonwood Creek Estates I and Cottonwood Creek Estates III 
Subdivsions. (R.560-561) 
By letter addressed to Judge Davidson, Sykes stated 
he had obtained a continuance of the July 14 hearing from the 
Judge's secretary. (R.562) 
Hatch made a Motion for Hearing (R.564-565) and an 
Order of Hearing was signed by the Judge and set the matter 
for hearing on August 26, 1986. (R.623-624) 
On August 19, 1986, Hatch filed his Motion To Strike 
Sykes June 5th Verified Objection; the July 3 Second 
-15-
Supplement Memorandum; and July 3, Pirst Amended Third-Party 
Complaint which were offered in opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment for noncompliance with R.56(e) 
U.R.Civ.P. (R.627-628) Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
were also filed. (R.629-630) 
On August 26, 1986, a hearing was held on Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Counsel for the Financial 
Institutions, Frandsens' and Hatch appeared as well as Sykes 
pro se. No transcript was ordered. The matter was taken 
under advisement and the court requested a five page limit on 
any further documents. (R.728) 
On August 26, Frandsens1 filed their Answers to Sykes 
Request for Admissions by handwritten "admit" or "I.K" 
(insufficient knowledge to admit but no reason to deny) on all 
138 paragraphs. (R.650-694) It should be noted that the court 
had previously deemed Hatch's Request for Admissions admitted 
by Frandsen for failure to answer. (R.322) 
Also, on August 26, 1986, Sykes filed a "Motion to 
File Verified Second Amended Third-Party Complaint, and also 
as Sykes' Seventh Supplemental Memorandum opposing Hatch's 
Motion for Summary Judgment." (R. 697-702); Affidavit Despain 
(R.716-720); one page Affidavit Sykes (R.721-722) 
incorporating all 162 pages of his Second Amended Third-Party 
Complaint and numerous other pleadings such as "Integrated 
Memorandum, etc." (R.752-759); "Priority Motion for Mandatory 
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Dismissal of Hatch's complaint, etc." (R.744-751) Despain 
also filed his Answers to Sykes' 45 page Request for 
Admissions by handwritten "admit" as to all 138 requests. 
(R.775-814) 
On October 16, 1986, Judge Davidson signed an Order 
stating the parties were to submit a summary within 15 days 
from this date, not to exceed 5 pages, and any additional 
supplements or responses to pending motions within this same 
15 day period. (R.822) 
On October, 31, 1986, Hatch filed his Summary 
(R.823-828) with attachments (R.829-835); Objections to 
Motion to File Second Amended Third-Party Complaint and . . . 
and Motion to Strike Third-Party Complaint; (R.836-841) 
Motion and Affidavit for Legal Fees. (R.846-860) 
November 4, 1986, Despain filed his Position Summary. 
(R.871-875) At this time Jones filed an "Affidavit Opposing 
Summary Judgment, etc." (R.876-888) Robinson filed a Position 
Summary for the Financial Institutions and Iverson (R.889-895) 
and Sykes filed his Summary. (R.896-904) Jones answered Sykes 
Request for Admissions admitting all requests (R.906-988) 
Sykes filed another Affidavit claiming he owned beneficial 
interest through the deeds attached. (R.989-1066) 
On November 5, 1986, by signed Minute Entry 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted. (R.1067) 
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On November 20, 1986, Sykes filed an 11 page Request 
for Reconsideration of the Minute Entry and Objection to 
Hatch's Proposed Order. (R.1133-1143) 
On November 20, 1986, Sykes filed a Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment against Hatch (R.1148-1150) and numerous 
other motions. (R.1152-1158) 
An Amended Order was entered November 26, 1986, 
quieting title in Hatch; granting his Motion to Strike 
Pleadings and Answers finding defendants were purchasers at 
their own risk; and taking under advisement Hatch's request 
for legal fees. (R.1159-1163) 
Thereafter on December 4, 1986, Sykes filed a Motion 
to Amend Order and Findings. (R.1164-1166) On December 10, he 
filed a 14 page Affidavit of Jones supporting Sykes' Motion. 
(R.1177-1191) Sykes filed numerous other pleadings on 
December 10, 1986, including a 16 page "Verified Supplemental 
Summary and Supporting Memorandum to Sykes Motion to Amend". 
(R.1241-1257) 
Hatch filed a Response to Sykes' Motion to Amend 
(R.1283-1288) and Response to Other Motions and Objections to 
the December 4 Affidavit. (R. 1289-1291) 
On January 12, 1987 a "Motion for Award $901,581.80 
In Equitable Reimbursement and Unjust Enrichment" was filed by 
Sykes (R.1320-1321) and a 19 page document entitled "Manifest 
Error, etc. etc." which appears to be a memorandum in support 
of this Motion. (R.1322-1341) Various documents were 
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attached, one being the appraisal report relied on by Sykes to 
support his claim the property was worth $1,235,000 in 1982. 
(R.1359-1380) 
A "Ruling" signed by the Judge was entered January 
30, 1987, denying the multitude of motions filed by Sykes and 
granting Hatch $15,997.00 legal fees for the bad faith of 
Sykes. (R.1453-1454) Sykes filed his Notice of Appeal from 
this Ruling on February 27, 1987. (R.1472-1473) 
Robinson filed a Notice of Additional Appeal on March 
16, 1987, on behalf of 14 defendants including Despain, Jones, 
individually and Jones and Frandsen partnership, the financial 
institutions and several other third-party defendants, 
(R.1490-1492, Addendum C) which was dismissed by the Supreme 
Court as being untimely. 
The Verified Second Amended Third-Party Complaint is 
loose in the files, never having been stamped in filed by the 
clerk. However Sykes obtained an order of the Supreme Court 
allowing them to be paginated. The document is 84 pages long, 
(R.1496-1579) with 80 pages of attachments. (R.1580-1660) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Inequitable forfeiture was not raised as an issue 
at the time of summary judgment. This issue was first raised 
in post-judgment motions and is raised too late to be reviewed 
on appeal. There was no evidence as to amounts expended by 
Sykes or others. The appraisal report upon which Sykes relies 
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to support his claim the property has greatly appreciated in 
value was submitted long after summary judgment. The only 
properly filed pleadings in response to the Complaint was 
Sykes1 original answer and counterclaim which only claimed an 
interest in parcels admittedly conveyed out by Hatch. No 
leave was ever granted by the Court to file his Third Party 
Complaint, or First and Second Amended Third Party Complaints. 
II. Sykes obtained whatever interest he claims now 
with full knowledge of the default. He should not be allowed 
to challenge the notice given to his predecessors-in-
interest. Although Hadlock and other cases require notice of 
default to be given to assignees under a contract prior to the 
time their interest may be forfeited, the law should not be 
expended to allow Sykes to raise all defenses his 
predecessors-in-interest could have raised. His 
predecessors-in-interest filed answers in this case. They had 
a full opportunity to litigate this issue, but as their appeal 
has been dismissed the question of notice as to them should 
not be decided now. 
III. Summary judgment was properly granted in favor 
of Hatch. Sykes noticed some depositions in June and July 
1985 and did nothing more until June 1986, after Hatch's 
Motion for Summary Judgment had been filed. The Court did not 
abuse its discretion in not continuing summary judgment. 
Sykes did not offer affidavits or other verified pleadings in 
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compliance with Rule 56(e), U.R.Civ.P. to support any claim of 
prior breaches by Hatch and the issue was not raised by the 
pleadings. 
There was no genuine issue of fact in dispute that 
there was a default under the contract. There was no evidence 
to contradict Hatch's sworn statement that $8000 was 
delinquent in property taxes. 
Frandsen did or should have raised the issue of 
whether Hatch wrongfully refused to reinstate his contract. 
His appeal was dismissed and Sykes cannot raise the issue now. 
IV. Sykes' claims that he wasn't given an 
opportunity to present evidence; to conduct discovery; or to 
have hearings on his motions are without merit. Hearing on 
summary judgment was held four months after it was filed. 
After hearing the court allowed additional time to respond in 
excess of that allowed by Rule 56(c), U.R.Civ.P. Sykes' 
notices of depositions in June and July 1985 were untimely and 
confusing. He did not attempt any further discovery until 
after Hatch had moved for summary judgment. Rule 2.8, 
followed in the Seventh District Court, provides motions shall 
be decided without hearing, except for summary judgment. 
Sykes was given prior notice pursuant to Rule 2.9(b) of the 
order upon which this appeal is based. 
V. Legal fees were properly granted for Sykes' bad 
faith and this Court should award legal fees. Other than his 
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original Answer and Counterclaim, the voluminous pleadings 
filed by Sykes are confusing and non-meritorius. Hatch 
incurred enormous legal fees in responding to Sykes. Sykes 
holds himself out as an "expert land consultant" and was 
originally hired by the developers of the subdivision to help 
straighten out the title and other problems. He may have 
gotten deeds and assignments from them so that he could 
represent them while acting pro se. His conduct would not be 
tolerated by an attorney and legal fees against him would 
discourage such conduct in the future. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
INEQUITABLE FORFEITURE WAS NOT TIMELY OR PROPERLY 
RAISED IN THE TRIAL COURT. 
A. Inequitable Forfeiture Was First Raised In 
Post-Judgment Motions. 
In his Conclusion on page 48 of his brief, Sykes 
requests this Court to reverse the Amended Order except as to 
paragraph 3 which quiets title in Hatch and award Sykes 
$901,181 or other amounts for inequitable forfeiture "pursuant 
to Sykes1 Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment." 
Alternatively to reserve the balance of the Amended Order and 
remand for further consideration of "Sykes1 Motion on 
Inequitable Forfeiture." 
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Sykes' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment was filed 
November 20, 1986 (R. 1148-1149) along with a Request for 
Reconsideration (R. 1133-1143) after Hatch's Motion for 
Summary Judgment has been granted by Minute Entry on November 
5, 1986. (R.1067) A formal "Amended Order" was entered 
November 26, 1986. (R.1159-1163) His Motion on Inequitable 
Forfeiture was filed January 21f 1987. (R. 1320-1321) 
Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 
P.2d 1040 (Utah 1938) involved a foreclosure on a contract to 
sell real property. Certain lienholders raised the issue of 
priority and modification of the interest rates for the first 
time in their objection to the summary judgment, two weeks 
after the final judgment had been announced and one week after 
the formal judgment was signed and entered. The Supreme Court 
stated at p. 1045: 
w
. . . the record indicates that his argument 
was made too late; it was not presented to the 
trial court prior to the ruling on the motion 
for summary judgment . . . . Generally, issues 
raised for the first time in post-judgment 
motions are raised too late to be reviewed on 
appeal." 
In Cunningham v. Cunningham, 690 P.2d 549 (Utah 1984) 
the Supreme Court would not decide an issue where it was 
raised for the first time below in post-trial memorandum. An 
issue raised in post-trial motions for the first time did not 
preserve the point for appeal. Barson v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, 
Inc. , 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984); State v. Erickson, 722 P.2d 
756 (Utah 1986). 
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B. No evidence was offered to support his claim for 
inequitable forfeiture. 
There was no admissible evidence submitted by Sykes 
on August 26, 1986 when Hatch's Motion was heard (R.728) nor 
even on October 31, 1986, which was the additional time 
allowed by the trial court, as to any amounts allegedly paid 
by Sykes or as to the value of the property, and Hatch 
strongly objects to Sykes statement of facts and allegations 
in his brief on these points. Any references to the Record 
after page 860 are documents submitted after October 31, 1986. 
The allegation on page 7 of his brief that the 
"various Cottonwood Creek Estate's developers expended 
millions of dollars in subdividision, rezoning, development 
and annexation costs" has no reference to the record, and 
appears to include sums allegedly expended on Cottonwood Creek 
Estates I and Cottonwood Creek Estates III, adjoining 
subdivisions. 
Also his claim of $778,000 in liens (Appellant's 
Brief p. 7) included Cottonwood Creek Estates I and Cottonwood 
Creek Estates III. His reference to the record in support of 
this claim is Addendum M. Counsel's copy of Sykes' brief has 
addendums marked "A" through "H" and "NH through "SH. As best 
as counsel can determine addendum M is a copy of a document 
entitled Schedule B. This document purports to reassign trust 
deeds to Sykes with handwritten notations as to loan 
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amounts. It proves nothing as to amounts paid by anyone to 
Hatch, and was only offered by Sykes to support his claim of a 
beneficial interest in the property. Only four lots in 
Cottonwood Creek Estates II are listed (32, 40, 41 and 42), 
three of which never existed, as it was only divided into 36 
lots. 
Sykes1 claim in his Statement of Facts (Appellant's 
Brief p. 10) that he and his associates expended some $500,000 
in obtaining conveyances of the entire Cottonwood project has 
no reference to the record. He also argues he purchased a 
subcontract for Cottonwood Creek Estates II for $231,000 
consideration with reference to R. 1607. Any reference to the 
record after October 31, 1986 at R. 860 was not timely to 
oppose Summary Judgment. Record 1607 is a Warranty Deed to 
Sykes reciting consideration of $231,000 for all Cottonwood 
Creek Estates Subdivisions I, II and III. This deed no more 
proves the consideration was paid than the typical deed 
reciting for "$10 and other good and valuable consideration" 
proves the $10 was the amount so paid. 
Sykes argues (Appellant's Brief p. 7) that the 
property had greatly increased in value and refers to an 
appraisal report. The appraisal report was submitted January 
21, 1987 in support of his Motion for Equitable Reimbursement 
(R. 1359-1388) and was not timely for summary judgment. Other 
references to the record are all Answers to his Requests for 
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Admissions: (R. 784, R. 793) Despain's Answers; (R. 668) 
Frandsen's Answers; (R. 925) Jone's Answers. These Answers 
are not admissible evidence as to the value of the property 
and were objected to by Hatch on the grounds they were not in 
compliance with Rule 56e, U.R.Civ.P. and could not be made on 
personal knowledge but were bare conclusions. (R.825, 842-844) 
Even as late as November 4, 1986 when Sykes filed 
another of his own affidavits he only stated that he owned a 
beneficial interest as shown by the documents attached, which 
"were purchased for good and valuable consideration. (R. 
989-1066) 
C • The Pleadings Did Not Raise the Issue of 
Inequitable Forfeiture. 
No evidence was submitted on inequitable forfeiture 
at the time of summary judgment because it was not made an 
issue until post-judgment motions. 
On August 26, 1986, the only pleading properly filed 
by Sykes was his original Answer, Cross-Claim and 
Counterclaim, which claimed an interest in a ten acre parcel 
(or two 10 acres parcels) admittedly conveyed by Hatch. 
(R.97-101, Addendum A) A Third-Party Complaint had been 
improperly filed with the Clerk by Sykes in July 1985 
(R.176-182) contrary to Rule 14, U.R.Civ.P. Rule 14, 
U.R.Civ.P. provides that if more than ten days has expired 
after a party serves his original answer, he must obtain leave 
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of court, on motion and upon notice to all parties, before he 
can file a third-party complaint. The Third-Party Complaint 
contained no mailing certificate to Hatch's counsel, and was 
only discovered by Hatch's counsel in response to his summary 
judgment agreement. (R.328-338) The Third-Party Complaint 
sought to quiet title in Sykes of all of Cottonwood Creek 
Estates I, II and III; to set aside a foreclosure sale 
unrelated to Cottonwood Creek Estates II; to reform deeds on 
lots 33, 34, 14, and 15; to foreclose on two mechanics liens; 
and for fraud against Thompson. 
Not until a year later, on July 8, 1986, did he move 
to file this Third-Party Complaint. (R. 516-517) He had 
previously filed a Motion for Leave to file a First Amended 
Third-Party Complaint on June 16, 1986. (R. 433-436) On the 
date of hearing on summary judgment he moved to file a Second 
Amended Third-Party Complaint. (R.697-702) These motions were 
objected to by Hatch on the grounds that they unnecessarily 
added additional parties and other causes of action relating 
to Cottonwood Creek Estates I and III, and also because the 
matter had been pending since March 1985 and had been set for 
hearing on plaintiff's Motion for Summary judgment. (R. 
560-561, 836-841) The Second Amended Third-Party Complaint 
was 84 pages long, listed 69 claims with claims 70-80 
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supposedly deferred pending further discovery and amendment 
and added hundreds of third-party defendants. (R. 1497-1579 
Attachments 1580-1660) Sykes1 motions were denied by the 
Court. (R.1453-1454) 
Had Sykes genuinely wished to raise the issue in his 
pleadings of inequitable forfeiture, he should have moved to 
amend his original Answer and Counterclaim back in 1985. Even 
his improperly filed Third-Party Complaint filed in July 1985 
did not raise the issue. Instead he waited until several 
months after Hatch had filed his summary judgment motion, and 
sought to file amended pleadings joining numerous other causes 
of actions and third-party defendants unrelated to Hatch's 
foreclosure. 
For a question to be considered on appeal, the 
record must clearly show that it was timely 
presented to the trial court in a manner 
sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon; we 
cannot merely assume it was properly raised, 
(citation ommitted) The burden is on the 
parties to make certain that the record they 
compile will adequately preserve their 
arguments for review in the event of an 
appeal." Franklin Financial v. New Empire 
Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983) 
Sykes has not carried his burden of proving the issue 
he now raises was timely or sufficiently presented to the 
trial court and therefore this Court should not consider it on 
appeal. 
The other major parties to this lawsuit, namely 
Frandsen, Jones, Despain, and Thompson did not plead 
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inequitable forfeiture in their answers. Frandsen's Answer. 
(R. 64-66) Thompsons pro se answer filed June 17, 1985 after 
default entered. (R. 145) Despain's pro se answer. (R. 
118-119) Jones default was entered. (R. 199-202) They either 
did not appeal or their appeal has been dismissed as being 
untimely. 
POINT II 
SYKES HAD NOTICE OF THE DEFAULT PRIOR TO OBTAINING 
ANY INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO 
RAISE THE ISSUE OF IMPROPER NOTICE TO HIS PREDECESSORS-IN-
INTEREST. 
It is undisputed that Hatch's Notice of Default was 
recorded May 11, 1984. (R. 326-327, 352 Paragraph 34) 
Sykes first interest in the property was a Notice of 
Contract and Interest in Real Property, recorded January 17, 
1985 and referred to a Real Estate Contract dated June 22, 
1984. (R.44-G) At the time Notice of Default was given Sykes 
had no recorded interest in the property and Hatch could not 
have given him notice. 
All deeds, assignments and contracts through which 
Sykes claims an interest are subsequent to May 11, 1984. Many 
were acquired after suit had been commenced. Counsel can find 
no documents supplied to the Court at the time summary 
judgment was heard or as of October 31, 1986, that show any 
recorded interest of Sykes prior to the recorded default. 
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The issue of notice was not raised in Sykes' Answer, 
Counterclaim and Cross-Claim, the only response properly 
filed. Hatch agrees that assignees of a buyer's interest in a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract are entitled to notice of the 
default and an opportunity to cure before their rights may be 
forfeited, as set for in Hadlock v. Showcase Real Estate, 
Inc., 680 P.2d 395 (Utah 1984). However, Sykes misconstrues 
Hadlock and argues that as assignee of the contract he now has 
standing to argue that his predecessors in interest were not 
given proper notice. This argument is without merit for two 
reasons: 
First, Hadlock only stated that assignees themselves 
are entitled to the same rights as the original buyer under 
the contract to be notified. Thus, Sykes could complain that 
he received no notice as an assignee of the contract, which he 
doesn't do but argues his predecessors were not properly 
notified of the default. Pearce v. Shurtz, 270 P.2d 442 (Utah 
1954) is relied upon by Sykes for this proposition. The 
quoted portion of that case in Sykes brief (P.34) is from the 
dissenting opinion. In Pearce, the buyer sold land on 
contract which had a forfeiture clause that provided upon 
default the buyer would become a tenant at will. Four 
assignments of the contract were made. Seller did not demand 
payment from the original buyer or any assignees. After the 
grace period had run, he sued the three assignees in an 
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unlawful detainer action but did not sue the original buyer. 
The court held that as it was an unlawful detainer action, 
which applies to those in possession, the original buyer did 
not have to be joined. Also, the last assignee who had 
defaulted on the contract with his sellers, could not rely 
upon the acceptance of late payments by the seller from others 
to excuse the default in payments on his own contract. Seller 
was allowed to keep all payments made. 
Secondly, Sykes predecessors-in-interest entered 
appearances in this case and had the opportunity to litigate 
lack of notice and inequitable forfeiture, on their own 
behalf. All claimed predecessors in interest of Sykes entered 
appearances pro se or through counsel except Thompson who was 
personally served April 2, 1985 (R.52-57) and whose default 
was entered June 10, 1985, prior to his belated handwritten 
answer (R.145), and Jones whose default was entered pursuant 
to service by publication. (R.199-202, 204-206) However, Mark 
Robinson filed a Notice of Appeal on behalf of Jones along 
with Despain and Frandsen and others. (R. 1490-1492, Addendum 
C) which appeal was dismissed. Any claims of improper notice 
and inequitable forfeiture of Sykes1 predecessors-in-interest 
should have been raised by them on their own behalf as they 
had full opportunity to do so. As their appeal has been 
dismissed, improper notice as it applies to them cannot now be 
decided. 
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The law set forth in Hadlock, supra, should not be 
expanded in this fact situation so as to allow Sykes to raise 
all defenses his predecessors in interest could have raised 
but didn't. Sykes purports to be an expert land consultant 
and became involved in this matter pursuant to a "Consulting 
Employment Agreement" entered in June 1984 with Thompson and
 e 
Cottonwood Creek Estates II. (R.1265) He was employed to^ 
"trouble-shoot, evaluate, plan . . . and attempt to devise or 
effect solutions to or purchase of employers1 various land 
developments in Duchesne County, Utah" at the rate of $1750 
per day. 
His method of effecting these solutions is described 
in the Affidavit of H. L. McCoy submitted by Sykes. 
"Over the last 20 years I have employed 
Dr. Sykes on and off as a land consultant, 
"trouble-shooter" and legal problem solver at 
rates of $1000 to $4000 per day . . . 
Over the years, though he is not an 
attorney, I have also observed Dr. Sykes 
investigate and resolve other complex land, 
title, and legal problems, for me and others . 
He has been a party, consultant or expert 
witness in hundreds of litigations. In recent 
years he has inclined toward a more direct 
involvement or to representing himself, often 
alone or in concert with collaborating 
attorneys. Previously self taught, he is now a 
third-year law student at Brigham Young 
University . . . " (R.447-450) 
Although only a third-year law student it may be 
Sykes purchased the interests of the very parties he was 
employed by, so as to pursue their claims, purportedly acting 
pro se in his own behalf. 
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In any event he became involved with full knowledge 
of the default and litigation. Any sums paid, if any, were 
likewise expended with knowledge of the default. "A court of 
equity will generally not assist one in extricating himself 
from circumstances which he has created." Battistone v. 
American Land and Development Co., 607 P.2d 837 (Utah 1980). 
POINT III 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN FAVOR OF 
HATCH. 
Sykes requests this Court, in the alternative, to 
reverse the entire order and remand for further consideration 
and argues that summary judgment was improper. Hatch will 
respond to each of the points raised by Sykes in his brief. 
A. Summary Judgment Should Not Be Reversed Because 
Discovery Was Not Completed. 
Although Sykes did file notices of depositions in 
1985, of certain defendants and nonparties, to which Hatch 
objected because of Notice (Point IV) he did not notice 
Clayton B. Hatch's deposition until after Hatch's Motion for 
Summary Judgment had been pending for two months. (R.323) 
During the interim from July 1985 through April 1986, 
Sykes obtained the cooperation of several of the defendants he 
now claims he was unable to depose. On August 7, 1985, 
Despain signed an unrecorded quit-claim deed to Sykes. 
(R.444-M) On August 7, 1985, Jones signed an unrecorded 
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assignment of contract to Sykes. (R. 446) And apparantly 
Thompson appeared for his deposition June 19, 1985. (R. 563) 
As stated in Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311 (Utah 
1984), the party opposing summary judgment must timely present 
his affidavit under Rule 56(f) stating reasons why he is 
unable to proffer evidentiary affidavits and unless "dilatory 
or lacking in merit" the motion should be liberally treated. 
It was not until a year later, on July 8, 1986, after 
summary judgment was set for hearing, that Sykes filed a 
Motion for Sanctions for Refusal to Make Discovery. 
(R.509-510) It was within the trial court's discretion not to 
continue summary judgment due to the lateness of Sykes' motion 
and the fact he did not attempt any discovery from July 1985 
until after Hatch's Motion was filed in April 1986, although 
he was able to obtain deeds and assignments from Jones and 
Despain within this period. (R.650,775) 
B. There Was No Admissible Evidence Of Prior 
Breaches Or Bad Faith By Hatch. 
In support of Sykes' claims of prior breaches by 
Hatch, arguing the same would excuse strict performance by the 
buyers, Sykes refers to R. 653-9 which is Frandsen's Answers 
to his Request for Admissions filed August 26, 1986 and R. 
778-84 which are Despain's answers to his Request for 
Admissions, believed to have been filed August 26, 1986. 
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Also in support of this argument Sykes cites to R. 
1096-9 which is Jones' Affidavit filed after October 31, 1986 
and R. 1177-90 which is another Affidavit of Jones filed 
December 10, 1986. These affidavits were not timely to oppose 
summary judgment. 
None of the answers filed at this point had raised 
prior breaches by Hatch as defenses. 
Even if the issue had been properly raised and 
presented to the Court, it is without merit. Sykes argues 
that a $7000 payment made on December 31, 1980 was made 
directly to Hatch and outside the escrow account. The escrow 
account credits this payment on 12/31/80 and notes it was paid 
direct. (R.1214) Buyers were not disadvantaged in any way. 
Also the allegations that Hatch released worthless 
land in 1980 and 1983 does not support Sykes1 position that 
summary judgment was improper against him. In Pearce v. 
Shurtz, 270 P.2d 442, 2 Utah 2d 124 (Utah 1954), the Court 
held that the fourth assignee could not rely upon late 
payments accepted by the original seller to excuse his own 
late payments. 
C# There Was No Genuine Issue Of Fact In Dispute 
That There Was A Default. 
The only issue and arguable defense raised by Sykes 
in opposition to Hatch's Motion for Summary Judgment was that 
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no default- ^,iA P T - ^ T ' * -~^~- *-hr r^p*--^**, 
Hatct Lleged affidavit support •
 il±s 
motion 1 - - taxes 
f o r 1 9 8 2 3*KI L ^ S J w^:» .i--. v . - ^  *it ». : which .^  * ? av 
$8000. I ozj-ji/A, Addendum O; Nunc ui cue J 
this fact. 
Sykes argue, n<:- oaragraph at aqe ** nr » r s . <-r* 
t 
I i . • Affidavi was : i :Hd a':er r-n G n --^ < 
1986 cuto* Addendum u »-•• - h e a r s a U a t n c wa : jid 
1 y i > e w i" i 11 e n p o r t i o n s S y k e s 
r e f e r s - ; c 1 e a r 1 y - • t n • • i . t y p e w r i t e r , a n d a r e ra t h e r 
confusing • - l^nes nad a: • - \ »il l li in I nil hi s i; o= \,ni • :: i is 
four page Affidavit (P. :.**i, .
 4<^ ;.- *IK;I the typewritten part i s 
after his. signature for three more pages, after which Jones 
. ) • • . • • ' 
Hatch alleged that the $7000 payment made ! i- '.983 
w a s for t;h'fji r e l e a s e o f t e n a c r e s , a n d n o t a l s o uu u e c . •-i 
e d mi in ir in .1-1 III p a y m e n t , j m l t h e r e t o r e ( h e a n n u a l p a y m e r * - * •-
default. The Hatch/Despain/Jones contract . >vided at 
paragraph 17 that seller would rflo.is^ ?il .•im 
buye - pdiU . • at h\ ,;i ,t/ilil pei acne • addit^ -
annual payment,"" The escrow account reflects $70000 paid May 
( U I '" 1 4 ) T!: : • H .11 111 ,. I I 1 1 II II Mill III I I II 1 1 IIHh 
conveyed J, five acre 1 ots and was dated May 24, 1983. (R. 
272) Jones made allegations in post-judgment pleadings that 
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he had a letter signed by Hatch stating the $7000 payment made 
in 1983 was to be applied to the annual payment. In response 
Hatch's Affidavit stated " . . . such letter has never been 
produced because it did not exist." (R. 1296-1300) Sykes 
continues to argue at page 42 of his brief that Hatch 
confirmed by letter he would accept the $7000 for release of 
the ten acres and annual payment, which is simply not 
supported in the record. 
The trial court correctly found there as no genuine 
issue of material fact in dispute. There was no evidence 
denying the default in the property taxes of $8000. The bare 
assertion a letter existed showing Hatch agreed the $7000 
would apply both to the annual payment and for the release of 
ten acres was not sufficient to modify the written contract. 
D. Sykes Was Not Entitled To Notice Of The Default. 
As pointed out in Point II, Hatch's Notice of Default 
was recorded May 11, 1984 (R. 325-327, 352 par. 34) prior to 
any interest, or any recorded interest of Sykes. 
E . Whether Or Not Hatch Wrongfully Refused To 
Reinstate The Contract Is Not An Issue on Appeal. 
For the same reasons argued in Points I and II of 
this brief, although Frandsen could have raised the issue of 
wrongful refusal to reinstate, Sykes cannot raise it. His 
conveyances and assignments from Frandsen were made after suit 
was commenced and after Frandsen had already entered an 
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appearance through counsel Frandsen"s appeal has been 
dismissed. 
:. rence fn i-he record to 
support this argument. (Appellar Brief i 
POI.N j 
SYKES WAS GIVEN A A . A OPPORTUNITY mrx PRESENT HIS 
CASE. 
S y Ik i < " ' ' , I " n i 1.1 I 11 i m i 1 1 in i n In i !•. 1 1 ] i Il I II in i in I II in-1 in „ i ' , I I K 1 1 " I 1 1 , ' f i i i i i - i i i 
o p p o r t u n i t y to pre s e n t evidence M ~ - C , tar-.- i orfeitui: e; 
that d i s c o v e r y was thwarted uy Hatv. -: ~ tudu ue wds MI i ed 
(jut? jiiocir'ss because no hearings were .
 t • n hie nost-judgment 
motions, M l claims are unfounded. 
Sykos was | i i < m n i|« iieinm iiiii nint HI U nm in i 1^ :4111 mi 
f ^ H a t c h ' s M o t i o n lot Summary judgment, 'I he M o t i o n w a s filed 
April 2 2 r 1986 ( R . 5 2 8 - 3 3 8 ) : the matter wis set foi hearinq 
' -icns air:- . >. t :.~n * >.,- x , ^ c * , a Ah -at i r,»; 
August **\J
 t . uu m e lout muntn 
numerous nl* ^ ,na? *^ » *"h<=> r!ay ^ f h^:*r «ig requested leave 
: ; Second Amended s r : Fd r: :omplair * - * — 702) 
n^ tidU -. 
nriaina: Complaint. 
Even after hearing, the fout f allowed an additional 
-• I'riii I P L M I Minimi I ii t ive pii'qe SIIIIIIIIJ r y inn m y 
additional supplements or responses to pending motions. 
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(R.822) Sykes complains that the Order which was signed 
October 16 and states the parties were to submit these 
additional responses ". . . within 15 days from this date," 
should have allowed him until November 3 to file his 
supplements, which was the date they were filed. 
Rule 56(c), U.R.Civ.P., provides that the Motion for 
Summary Judgment shall be served at least ten days before the 
time fixed for hearing and that the adverse party, prior to 
the day of hearing, may serve opposing Affidavits. It was 
well within the Judge's discretion to have not allowed any 
additional time to respond and Sykes should not complain he 
was given more time than that set forth in Rule 56, U.R.Civ.P. 
Sykes did not present evidence to support his claim 
of inequitable forfeiture prior to summary judgment because he 
had not presented the issue to the Court; not because he 
wasn't given an opportunity to do so. 
Sykes also argues throughout his brief that he should 
have had an opportunity prior to summary judgment to complete 
discovery and cites Cox v. Winters, 678 P. 2d 311 (Utah 1984). 
Cox states that if discovery was initiated prior to the filing 
of the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court has discretion 
to continue the motion pending completion of such discovery. 
Hatch's Motion was filed April 22, 1986. Sykes first 
filed a notice of Hatch's deposition on June 16, 1986, (R.323) 
Hatch objected as he was the last deponent and the Notice 
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stated if not completed c- '-7-.- ^r the "epornt:. - " be 
continued to • Ji ily <!. H a t r ,r, w -r 1 L ^ i ^ a v e i m ^ tu uieui o n 
two separate occas ions wm-n t, m.- lawsui t was pending i n 
Duchesne County. 
I,!, rosponro Sykos i-nly I 1 It l .1 M' linn, «• -
on July il, (k. 1J09- hi 0 J No supporting memorandum; set ;
 :-.H 
Motion for hearing on July 14 (K. SI I-51 3) which hearing was 
oon t i nuf.:<1 I u Ani
 (ii I h , Syk* s li I ii "I ui lei 1 "I i<JiiSi"i i^ t nl 
the August 26 hearing, thus there is no evidence the Court did 
not consider his motion. 
Hatch objected in S/kes" Notices of Depositions for 
parties other than Hatch on t.he grounds the notices were 
1  11 i t 1 fne I y in H'Xdiiiij 11 e w.i • I In- N< i l 11 <j iiiiiaii 1 e d J 1 11: l e .."' Il Il IMS 
for deposition scheduled June J9# 19HS. |R.l 54) In June and 
July, Sykps sent seven Notices of Deposit;! ons to be held in 
i) 1: i:»1111 11 ', il 1 , 1 mi 1 mi 1 1 11. tj 11111111 1 j 1 , 1 i 11 11 !•! 111 g m a n n e r : • a h 
received an Amended Notice of Thompson"s Deposition 
(k. 2xG~2. . • r * *" <-. ~ ; .- -,j the lirat nut w «IJ
 r 1 1 l \ is 
delivered • ..-. otfice ot McKatj » DeLand. 
(*•. ..07-208) Hatch objec*t-o -> si I but thr last; two as being 
uriLiniel 1 \ 1 em 1 i>r 1 IIH depusi 1 J MII 
schedule * ,i -\xu^ , ~; apparently Sykes f n,k "he 
deposition of Thompson in June (R.563) despite Hatch's 
ob lect i oni"!. 
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After his flurry of activity in June and July 1985, 
Sykes did not attempt any more depositions until a year later 
in June 1986, after Hatch's motion had been filed. 
Sykes' Request for Admissions, Interrogatories and 
Request for Production of Documents were not filed until July 
31, 1986, (R.573-619) after notice of the August 26 hearing 
date had been given. Although he had 30 days to answer, Hatch 
answered within ten days by responding to those he did not 
object to, and objected to the others on various grounds such 
as that they were unintelligible, overly broad, contained 
multiple questions which made it impossible to form an 
intelligent answer, and they were not properly framed as 
requests for admission. (R.631-639) Although entitled Request 
for Admissions, they were merely a copy of his First or Second 
Amended Third Party Complaint. (R.518-548) A sample of what 
counsel was requested to admit is quoted verbatim below: 
8. Third Party Plaintiff, including 
Plaintiffs and Defendant, have no interest in 
subject property, or such interest, if any, is 
inferior and subordinate to, or contractually 
and validly committed to, Third Party 
Defendant, Sykes, except in certain instances 
as to certain lots/properties of Frontier 
International Land Corporation and Cottonwood 
Sundancer Corporation. (R.578) 
94. Third Party Defendant, Sykes, is not 
an attorney, although he has some legal and 
litigation experience and is presently a law 
student. That experience (repeatedly 
demonstrating the economic, legal, factual 
impracticality of prosecuting such complex 
actions, cost-effectively against 
failed/bankrupt projects/persons) led him to 
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:\i*. i at tern evidence herein, - -. *-uat uy 
acting f u -1 hand and pro 3/ as a land 
detective, :n '.jiverr * : r_ •. ~ collaborating 
attorney, t-\--=r . .•.,. «. ' * lc-a and factual 
issues and the cash flow problems in financing, 
prosecuting, and resolving complex litigation 
such as this action can be more advantageously 
and effectively accomplished or simplified—to 
the benefit of the Court and all parties and 
with less ru1 i ngs from the bench. (R.608) 
9 5. W he ne ve r po s s i b1 e, De f e nda nt, Sy k e s, 
attempts to resolve or simplify issues by 
negotiated settlement or by outright purchase 
of adverse claims, so that the cash available 
can go directly to the principals involved, 
rather than for attorney's fees and drawn out 
1 i t i g a t i o n c o s t s • (R • 6 0 8 - 6 0 9) 
Sykes also argues the trial court shoul d have granted 
hiin a 111ea 1:i ng : 1 : hi s 39 moti ons. Si x :>f his m o t i o n s were set 
for hearing July 14, which was continued to August 26 
(R. 511 - 512) S y k e s d I d n o t o i: d e 1: a t r a n s c r i p t o f t h e A u g u s t 2 6 
hearing, and tln-in ib nntinnu in -nppoti h 1 •  1 1 HIMIII I" 1 as 
denied a hearing on those motions. He wd« present August 26, 
and nit in r did, or should have brought the motions to the 
attention ot the Court. 
Rule 2.8 is followed in the Sevt ^ J "icial District 
C o m r .111 I  \JI ov 1 dps thai ma I fn r s will. In* deu_ i on memo rand urn, 
without hearing, unless it is a notion for s tiary judgment 
and hearing is requested by the party opposing the otion. 
,: y k n s ii I so 1 I 1 i i iii;, . 1 L r01 111 \i 1 * 1 \ 11 1 •. I»1 1 P \ hu t the 
1986 Amended Order was void for lack of notice. He dues not 
dnny th.:i! hr- w<i* qiven prior not ire t<\ the proposed 1986 
A m e n d e d 0 r d e r ( m a 1 1 e d N o v e m b t r I !, I " 1.! 111, s 1 q 11 e d I > / I 11 - 1 \ 1 r I1 
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November 24, 1986). (R.1162) He filed objections on November 
20 to it. (R.1133-1143) 
Rather he claims no notice of the July 1985 Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment wherein the 
default of certain defendants was entered and which were 
incorporated into the 1986 Order. Although Sykes had actual 
notice of the signed 1985 Judgment, he made no motion to set 
it aside. Even if Sykes did not receive prior notice, which 
Hatch denies, the Judgment is not "void" but simply deemed not 
"entered" for purposes of appeal. He clearly received timely 
notice of the 1986 Order upon which this appeal is based. The 
cases cited by Sykes stated that the time for taking an appeal 
from a judgment does not begin to run until Rule 2.9 has been 
complied with and copies of the proposed Judgment served on 
opposing counsel. Undisputedly, Rule 2.9 was followed prior 
to entry of the November 26, 1986 Amended Order and from which 
this appeal was taken. 
POINT V 
LEGAL FEES WERE PROPERLY AWARDED TO HATCH AND SHOULD 
ALSO BE AWARDED ON THIS APPEAL. 
The trial court granted Hatch's Motion for Attorneys 
Fees in the sum of $15,977.89 pursuant to §78-27-56 U.C.A. and 
stated: 
Mr. Sykes, by his actions in filing motions 
based purely on weight of the total paper and 
based on the Rules of Civil Procedure only 
incidentally, has attempted to confuse this 
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matter to the point where no one can. make sense 
of it. Then M r . Sykes will be free to buy up 
the pieces at some profit to himself. 
I ML j I i * 11, h i n Uii 11 Mm i t * s d i set" etion and 
should on;
 ; : «• r e v e r s e d on .j|,peal if S y k e s c a r r i e s his b u r d e n 
of proving abuse oi discretion* 
There is ample evidence to support the findi ng of the 
tri a l c o u r t . 
T i: :i e A £ f i d a v ii t : f H. I M c C o y s u b m i 11 e d b .y S ;y k e s 
states t h a t S yk e s h a d exp e rt i s e i n co mp1ex Ian d ma 11 e rs a nd 
had been a 1 i t i i g a n t i n h u n d r e d s o£ c a s e s . (R. 4 4 7 •- 4 5 0) 
T h e o i: I g i i i a J a i I s w e r f i 1 e d b y S y k e s o n 1 y c ] a i m e d a n 
interest i. i i a t e n a c r e p a r c e 1 , a d m i 11 e d ] y conveyed out by 
Hatch. {R.97-101) 
I t was n o t unti 1 a f t e r Hatch f i l e d fo r summary 
judgmer • i i ] 986 t h a t Sykes bombarded opposing c o u n s e l and the 
r i .ii i i i» i i h In i mv II! | j | r [\itw I ii I .1 h I ,up» ( I A pd t d<jr apli 
R e q u e s t s t o r A d m i s s i o n s ( k . S / 3 - b 2 Q f i l e d J u l y i l l , 1 9 8 6 ) ; 
F i r s t Amended T h i r d P a r t y C o m p l a i n t r o n t a m i n g t>9 c l a i m s and 
in p a g e s nil , . l b ,-Hi l i l n J J u l y r1 , MMi i ) ; S e c o n d Amended T h u d 
P a r t y C o m p l a i n t (R, 1496 -1V79 s u b m i t t e d on l h e d a t e of h e a r i n g 
A u g u s t 2h, 1 9 8 6 ; 84 p a q e s lOnq; Mil ^.i p nl i>xhii i I s mnl 
n a m i n g Ail t h u d - p a i I.y d e t e n d a n t s n o t p i e v i o t i s l y named by 
Hatch a s d e f e n d a n t s . ) 
Hatot'i ooiillil mil I m in "i i "" ii-ii mill.1 I. u u i , J R e q u e s t l u i 
Admiss ions because t h e y were i lot i n proper torm. His F i r s t 
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and Second Amended Third Party Complaints were likewise not in 
proper pleading form and contained frivolous claims. For 
example he sought to join the attorneys as third-party 
defendants for abuse of process, obstruction of justice and 
negligent or inadequate investigation* (R. 66-67) These 
claims are seemingly based upon counsel's objection to his 
untimely deposition notices and objection to joining 
additional parties. 
As stated by Sykes in his brief and Clayton Hatch's 
Affidavit (R.1296-1298) Sykes offered $35,000 for a quit-claim 
deed of Hatch's entire interest in the property even though 
approximately $111,000 was the balance due under the 
contract. Clayton Hatch also stated in his Affidavit: 
2. When he was at my house, trying to 
talk me into selling him all of my interest he 
gave me a copy of Morris v. Sykes and told me 
that "I didn't have a chance of winning," that 
the lawsuit " . . . would cost me a lot in legal 
fees" and ". . .he would keep it in litigation 
for years." He stayed until 2 a.m. Sunday and 
came back Monday. He kept pressuring me to 
accept his offer and I almost had to bodily 
remove him to get him to leave. (R.1297) 
Even after the Court ordered a five page limit on 
further pleadings (R. 728) on August 26, 1986, and after 
Summary Judgment, Sykes continued to file lengthy documents: 
11 page Request for Reconsideration filed November 20, 1986 
(R. 1133-1143); Jones 14 page Affidavit Opposing Summary 
Judgment filed December 10, 1986 by Sykes (R. 1177-1191); a 17 
page "Verified Supplimental [sic] Summary and Supporting 
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Memorandum, to Sykes Motion to Amend" filed December 10, 1988. 
(R. 1241-1257) 
II nl In wisliiii in in I 'I laitti to liaise the issues he 
now raises on appeal he coild have amended his original answer 
and (Counterclaim and raised them. in* IIMII IIF I mil inui i i i i , 
i,o I i L * - Amended Third Party Complain is, the last on ihn date 
set for hearing naming hundreds of adiitional thinJ |jaii-y 
defendant s , iind II wf i 1 d tr1 i *n t?.*«l \ i instead i f 
fi ling affidavits clearly setting fotth the facts in dispute 
he attempted to incorporate numerous | hjadi iqs 'm'h i Mn- in 
page Second Amoiuh d Mind Party Complain!, in i i HUH page 
Affidavit in opposition to Hatch's summary judgment. 
As pointed out in h nit ill ill " m 1 i h u .%' 111 t.ht i lit 
purchased the interests he claims on his < *n behalf u 
i'^ 's-iar the Employment Agreement mi behalf oi his 
whi ] e acting pro se. Paragraph i • t m e f 
acknowledges being brought in by the detune t developers I ". • 
con so I. id a i e u wnt.it so i p «»i the crazy-gu i It of I lens an el so I, MJ 
other myriad problems. 
Unfortunate!, counse f 
mess : £ paperwork •. i ronfosi n cr,*-
 ;:.. : thereby 1 --arc- \ ;~ 
incurred enormous 1ega1 fees. 
• Hatch a ] so rf^jmmts 
fees for *-hi.3 appeal This Court is aware that he filed two 
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motions to remit, which were denied by the Supreme Court and 
thereafter again filed a motion to remit which this Court held 
"despite differences in caption and format, are based on 
essentially the same grounds." He again raises the issue in 
his brief (p.47) and claims no final order was entered. 
Attached hereto (Addendum F) is a copy of a motion to %. 
remit stamped in filed "McRae & DeLand August 12, 1987" which > 
was the date it was received despite his mailing certificate 
of July 6 (his conclusion was dated August 6, 1987). Counsel 
received notice August 10, 1987 from the Supreme Court that 
this motion was denied before even receiving a copy of the 
motion. (Addendum G) 
Such actions may be intentional or inadvertant. 
Nonetheless, although he may represent himself pro se, he is 
still bound by the Rules of Procedure applicable to 
attorneys. Such actions as he has demonstrated in this case 
would not be tolerated by an attorney. The only protection 
someone facing such a pro se opponent has is an award of legal 
fees and which hopefully will discourage him from pursuing 
such a course of conduct against others in the future. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Hatch requests this 
Court find that Summary Judgment was properly granted against 
Sykes; that the Order denying his numerous post-judgment 
motions and awarding Hatch legal fees was properly granted; to 
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deny Sykes1 belated request for damages f" • -c :v: i f aMe 
forfeiture; and to award Hatch u^-^ v** iv^u ifiCuaeu .m Luis 
appeal., 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this yV^L day of November, 
1987. 
McRAE & DeLAND 
y for Respond* 
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